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We introduce a scheme that integrates a digital key in a phase-chaos electro-optical delay system for
optical chaos communications. A pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) is mixed within the chaotic
dynamics in a way that a mutual concealment is performed; e.g., the time delay is hidden by the binary
sequence, and the PRBS is also masked by the chaos. In addition to bridging the gap between algorithmic
symmetric key cryptography and chaos-based analog encoding, the proposed approach is intended to
benefit from the complex algebra mixing between a (pseudorandom) Boolean variable, and another
continuous time (chaotic) variable. The scheme also provides a large flexibility allowing for easy
reconfigurations to communicate securely at a high bit rate between different systems.
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Since the emergence of experimental chaos encryption
dating back to the seminal work of Cuomo et al. in the
earlier 1990s [1], proofs of principles have been exten-
sively reported ranging from electronic, optical [2] to
optoelectronic [3] systems. Recently, field demonstrations
have been conducted over installed optical fiber networks,
involving a high bit rate message, and using standard tele-
communications components [4,5]. Typically, the chaos is
generated using analog systems subject to either optical or
electro-optical delayed feedback. In chaos encryption there
is no rigorous counterpart to the digital key of algorithmic
cryptography. Confidentiality relies essentially on keeping
the hardware parameters secret. Unfortunately, the time
delay in itself, though being a very sensitive key parameter
for proper decoding, has been found to be vulnerable since
it can be identified using the autocorrelation function,
delayed mutual information (DMI), extrema statistics and
filling factor [6] even in systems with multiple delays [7].
Out of those, autocorrelation and DMI are robust to noise
perturbations and therefore are suitable to crack the time
delay. Still worse, once the time delay is identified, for
some systems the underlying chaotic dynamics can be
reconstructed using techniques such as artificial neural
networks, even in the presence of small amplitude noise
[8]. Another limit of hardware cryptography relies on the
fact that its parameter space dimension (a sort of equivalent
to the digital key size) is relatively low compared to
algorithmic cryptography.
To circumvent these drawbacks, we propose in this
Letter to implement a currently suggested principle in
algorithmic cryptography, which consists in mixing differ-
ent algebra when constructing the encryption algorithm
[9]. We combine a Boolean pseudorandom binary se-
quence (PRBS), used in algorithm cryptography, with a
high-dimensional chaotic time series generated by an
analog physical system, to make a symmetric-key encryp-
tion system with enhanced cryptographic security provided
by reciprocal concealment. At this point we notice that
while public-key encryption schemes have won popularity,
they have drawbacks such as limited speed and nonabso-
lute security. Thus symmetric-key algorithms are still
actively pursued, including new stream cyphers [10] and
cryptographic hash functions [11]. Besides, hybrid algo-
rithms such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) combine
public-key encryption to define a private key used for
fast symmetric encryption [12].
In general chaotic communications mix the digital mes-
sage and the chaotic carrier, however, this mixing is quite
weak and the statistical properties of the message cannot be
controlled beforehand; thus, the masking of the chaotic
carrier statistical properties is quite limited. Through the
introduction of an amplitude-balanced entropy mixing
between a PRBS and a chaotic generation process, we
perform an efficient entropy amplification for the resulting
carrier even in absence of any message. As a consequence,
this approach proposes a solution both for the problem of
the introduction of an efficient digital key in chaos com-
munications, as well as for the problem of time-delay
concealment. There have been indeed recently a few at-
tempts to address separately these issues. In semiconductor
lasers with optical feedback, the optical feedback phase
plays an important role in the synchronization [13]; thus, a
digital key implemented by modulating that phase was
suggested [14]. In the same context, it has been also
suggested [15] that time delay can be masked if chosen
to be close to the laser relaxation time; however,
chaos complexity is weak in that regime. Systems with
time-delay modulation [16] proposed as alternatives to get
around the time-delay extraction are, however, very diffi-
cult to implement practically.
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Here we propose a configuration built on a double
electro-optic delayed feedback dynamics. Our proposal is
based physically on high speed phase chaos [17] which has
been recently successfully tested in a chaos communica-
tion field experiment up to 10 Gb=s [5]. Though the pro-
posed system is inspired by the principles reported in [5],
structural architecture modifications have been necessary.
The proposed setup is illustrated in Fig. 1. Both emitter and
receiver consist of two similar nonlinear delayed differen-
tial processing chains, serially connected. The subindices
i ¼ 1, 2 refer to a given chain. Each chain has an electro-
optic phase modulator (PM) with a half-wave voltage V
seeded by a continuous-wave (cw) telecom semiconductor
laser (SL), which is phase modulated by an external signal
(whether the PRBS, R, or the message m). The electrical
input of the PM of a chain, is driven by the electrical output
of the other chain. The PM optical output of one chain thus
consists of two superimposed phase modulations, the
PRBS or the message, and the nonlinear delayed differen-
tial processing performed by the other chain. The phase-
modulated light beam is then processed according to the
delayed nonlinear dynamics of its chain. The time delay Ti
is performed by a length of fiber. The nonlinear trans-
formation is performed nonlocally in time [17], between
the input phase and the output intensity of a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer (MZI) with imbalancing Ti which is lon-
ger than the typical time scale of the phase modulation.
The intensity fluctuations are detected by an amplified
broadband telecom photodiode (PD). The output electrical
signal is further amplified by an rf driver, which gives the
output of the processing chain serving as the electrical
input for the other chain. The transmitted light beam is
the output of PM2, which contains the linearly superim-
posed message in DPSK (differential phase shift keying)
format.
The dynamical modeling can be described as follows.
The electronic bandwidth of the loop is assumed to result
from two cascaded linear first-order low-pass and high-
pass filters. Considering the filter output voltages V1ðtÞ and
V2ðtÞ and proceeding as in [17,18], the emitter dynamics
can be described by the dimensionless variables x1ðtÞ ¼
V1ðtÞ=ð2V;1Þ and y2ðtÞ ¼ V2ðtÞ=ð2V;2Þ:
x1 þ 1 dx1dt þ
1
1
u1 ¼ 1cos2½ðy2 þ RÞT1 þ1; (1)
y2 þ 2 dy2dt þ
1
2
u2 ¼ 2cos2½ðx1 þmÞT2 þ2; (2)
where du1=dt ¼ x1, du2=dt ¼ y2 and ðFÞt0 ¼Fðt t0Þ
Fðt t0t0Þ. The key physical parameters are arbitrarily
chosen, within the range of experimentally accessible val-
ues [17], as follows: the feedback strengths 1 ¼ 2 ¼ 5,
the delay times T1 ¼ 15 ns and T2 ¼ 17 ns, the fast (slow)
filter characteristic response times 1 ¼ 20 ps (1 ¼
1:6 s) and 2 ¼ 12:2 ps (2 ¼ 1:6 s), the MZI imbal-
anced delays T1 ¼ 510 ps and T2 ¼ 400 ps, and the
MZI static phases 1 ¼ =4 and 2 ¼ =8.
We first consider that no message is transmitted (mðtÞ ¼
0) to show the role of the PRBS in the statistical properties
of the carrier x1ðtÞ. As stated before, the most robust
methods to extract the time delay are the autocorrelation
CðsÞ and the DMI between the value of the variable and its
time-lagged version [6]. We focus on these two methods
since extrema statistics and filling factor methods are so
sensitive to noise that even just 1% noise added to the
carrier prevents them from working properly. Figure 2
displays CðsÞ and the DMI computed from the transmitted
phase proportional to x1ðtÞ, without PRBS (red [grey] line)
and with a PRBS of amplitude =2 at 3 Gb=s (black line).
In the first case both functions show peaks at T ¼ T1 þ T2,
T þ T1, T þ T2 and T þ T1 þ T2, so that all relevant
time delays can be readily identified. The delay time
signature vanishes completely when the PRBS is included.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the size of peaks found inCðsÞ
and DMI at the relevant delay times as a function of the
PRBS bit rate considering an amplitude of =2. The peaks
are clearly distinguishable for zero bit rate (no PRBS).
Increasing the bit rate, the peak size decreases. For low bit
rates RðtÞ and Rðt T1Þ take the same value most of the
time, soðRÞT1 usually vanishes and the effect is small (see
the concept of temporal nonlocality as introduced in [17]).
Therefore the peaks both in the DMI and inCðsÞ can still be
distinguished from the background standard deviation,
shown with bars in the figure [19]. When the bit rate reaches
a value corresponding to the inverse of T1 ( 1:97 Gb=s),
ðRÞT1 is typically nonzero, and the PRBSplays a key role in
FIG. 1 (color online). Setup (see text).
FIG. 2 (color online). CðsÞ (a) and DMI (b) without PRBS
( red [grey]), and with a 3 Gb=s PRBS of amplitude =2 (black).
A 10 s time series with 107 data points was used.




the dynamics, concealing the time-delay peaks. The size of
the peaks as a function of the PRBS modulation amplitude
[Figs. 3(c) and 3(d)] is a -periodic function associated to
the periodicity of cos2 in Eq. (1).APRBSof amplitude has
no effect sinceðRÞT1 only takes values 0 or and both are
equivalent in the cos2 term. Efficient concealment occurs for
amplitudes between =3 and 2=3 approximately. This
range broadens increasing .
Remarkably enough, while the PRBS conceals the delay
time in the chaotic carrier x1ðtÞ, the cross correlation
between x1ðtÞ and RðtÞ is of the order of 103, meaning
that the digital key itself is also concealed in the chaotic
carrier. This is explained by the fact that the interplay
between balanced amplitudes of the chaos and a PRBS is
optimizing the mutual nonlinear mixing, resulting in an
efficient mutual masking of each signal by the other.
At the receiver side, decoding is performed as follows.
The input phase-modulated beam is split into two paths.
The long path replicates the two serial processing chains
used for the encoding at the emitter, in which a synchro-
nized PRBS is involved, thanks to the knowledge of the
digital secret key. The analog secret key consists in the
hardware parameters determining the devices and their
exact operating conditions. The output of the two process-
ing chains, after being inverted, serves as the electrical
input of PM02, which is intended to cancel the carrier. The












v2 ¼ 02cos2½ðx1 þmÞT02 þ02; (4)
where dv1=dt ¼ z1, dv2=dt ¼ w2, and primes refer to the
receiver parameters. The output of PM02 is then expected to
be the phase modulation issued by the message only. It can
be demodulated using a standard DPSK demodulator, con-
sisting in an MZI with an imbalance delay time Tm and a
photodetector. The detected power is
PðtÞ / cos2½ðx1 þmÞTm  ðz1ÞTm (5)
where in this specific case ðFÞTm ¼ FðtÞ  Fðt TmÞ.
The decoded message m0ðtÞ is obtained from PðtÞ. For
perfect synchronization, z1ðtÞ is equal to x1ðtÞ, and m0ðtÞ
reproducesmðtÞ. While hardware mismatch is unavoidable
in practice, several field experiments [4,5] have demon-
strated that the resulting synchronization error is still ac-
ceptable. Moreover, the electro-optic phase dynamics we
consider as our basis has led to the best experimental chaos
synchronization quality reported so far over more than
10 GHz bandwidth. The correct decoding, however, de-
pends strongly on the matching of all the parameters, in the
same way as it was already investigated in the literature
[20]. The sensitivity of the decoding with respect to physi-
cal parameter mismatch is thus not revisited here. To check
that the PRBS indeed brings significant additional security
we consider in the following that the receiver parameters
are identical to the transmitter. The differences 1ðtÞ ¼




¼ 1  "11  1 sin½ð2 þ R
0  RÞT1




¼ 2  "22 (7)
where d"1=dt ¼ 1 and d"2=dt ¼ 2. From Eq. (7) it
turns out that 2 decays to zero after a time of order 2.
For R0 ¼ R, once 2 decayed to zero, the term ð2 þ
R0  RÞT1 in Eq. (6) vanishes so that 1 also decays to zero
after a time of order 1. Therefore the receiver synchro-
nizes perfectly to the emitter after a transient of order
1 þ 2. However, for a mismatched PRBS ð2 þ R0 
RÞT1 does not vanish, thus 1 remains finite, resulting in a
degraded synchronization. Actually, for identical parame-
ters, 2 decays to zero despite any eventual PRBS mis-
match; thus, the internal variable does synchronize.
Synchronization degradation takes place on the transmitted
variable.
Figure 4(a) displays the root-mean square synchroniza-
tion error  ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃh1ðtÞ2i=hx1ðtÞ2i
p
as a function of the per-
centage of wrong bits 	 in the receiver PRBS, where h  i
stands for time average.  grows fast from zero when the
PRBSs differ. Even for a 1% difference in the PRBS key, 
is close to 25% indicating a very poor synchronization.
When synchronization is degraded, z1ðtÞ does not replicate
x1ðtÞ, and the quality of the recovered message decreases.
The most relevant way to characterize this is by measuring
the bit error rate (BER) of the recoveredmessage [Fig. 4(b)].
FIG. 3 (color online). Absolute value of the peaks in CðsÞ (a),
(c), and DMI (b),(d), at T (d), T þ T2 (h), T þ T1 (þ ) and
T þ T1 þ T2 (.). In (a) and (b) the PRBS amplitude is =2
while in (c) and (d) the PRBS bit rate is 3 Gb=s. Solid line and
bars correspond to the background mean value and standard
deviation [19]. A series of length 267 times T was used.




The BER increases linearly with 	. For a pseudorandom
message of amplitude =2 ( 30% of the carrier ampli-
tude) transmitted at 10 Gb=s a 1% mismatch in the PRBS
leads to a BER of 0.01. Results are similar for keys of
different length as shown in Fig. 4(b).
In conclusion we have shown that a digital key can be
integrated with a chaos-based communication system in a
way that it conceals the delay time and it is necessary for
decoding. Besides bridging the gap between symmetric-key
algorithmic cryptography and chaos-based encoding, the
concealment of the time delay is particularly relevant to
prevent from eventual eavesdropper attacks. In our phase-
chaos electro-optical delay system the chaotic dynamics
does not reveal the digital key so it is possible to use it in
a repetitive way while concealing it. The interference
generated by the two similar time delays present in
our system plays a critical role in the mutual concealment.
We have found that in a similar electro-optical setup for
intensity chaos generation with a single delay time no
concealment takes place. In our system, the effective
key space of the encryption can be defined as the product
of the analog key size and the digital one. From another
viewpoint, the mixing of a digital source of entropy, and an
analogue one, can be viewed as an entropy amplification
procedure, which is strongly relevant in terms of crypto-
graphic security. Furthermore, the setup can be easilymodi-
fied or reconfigured, both from the digital or analogue
source of entropy.
On a broad perspective, as for PGP, chaotic symmetric
encryption schemes as proposed here may be devoted to
high speed secure data transmission. Asymmetric encryp-
tion (based on algorithmic cryptography, mutually coupled
optical chaos [21] or quantum key distribution [22]) could
bring the complementary solution for efficient and secure
(perhaps slower) secret key exchange.
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